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Abstract 
Nowadays, the publication of textual documents provides critical benefits to scientific research and 
business scenarios where information analysis plays an essential role. Nevertheless, the possible 
existence of identifying or confidential data in this kind of documents motivates the use of measures to 
sanitize sensitive information before being published, while keeping the innocuous data unmodified. 
Several automatic sanitization mechanisms can be found in the literature; however, most of them 
evaluate the sensitivity of the textual terms considering them as independent variables. At the same 
time, some authors have shown that there are important information disclosure risks inherent to the 
existence of relationships between sanitized and non-sanitized terms. Therefore, neglecting term 
relationships in document sanitization represents a serious privacy threat. In this paper, we present a 
general-purpose method to automatically detect semantically related terms that may enable disclosure 
of sensitive data. The foundations of Information Theory and a corpus as large as the Web are used to 
assess the degree relationship between textual terms according to the amount of information they 
provide from each other. Preliminary evaluation results show that our proposal significantly improves 
the detection recall of current sanitization schemes, which reduces the disclosure risk. 
 




In the last years, declassification of documents has become an essential tool to support information-
intensive tasks such as scientific research, problem analysis or decision making. Medical or business 
environments are important scenarios where the publication of documents can make the difference. 
For example, declassifying medical records has significantly improved a wide range of procedures 
related to detecting, verifying and monitoring new diagnostic examinations and treatment 
methodologies (Jiang et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the benefits of publishing textual documents are not provided without cost: on the one 
hand, many of these documents may contain confidential information about private entities; on the 
other hand, we live in a highly connected world where digital information can be easily copied and re-
distributed. As a result of both convergent situations, potentially untrusted third parties might have 
access to large quantities of sensible data which would be used without the consent of their owners 
(Chen & Zhao, 2012; Mishra et al., 2011). 
In order to avoid this dangerous situation, approaches designed to sanitize text documents before being 
declassified have been proposed in the past. Specifically, document sanitization techniques try to 
detect and remove or mask sensitive pieces of information from documents before being published, so 
that the risk of re-identification of individuals and/or of revealing confidential information is 
minimized. 
First sanitization techniques were based on the manual application of certain rules or guidelines 
(Agency, 2005) detailing the correct procedures to ensure irreversible suppression or distortion of 
sensitive pieces of information. Nevertheless, manual mechanisms have been reported to be time-
consuming (Dorr et al., 2006) and prone to disclosure risks (Cumby & Ghani, 2011). Moreover, they 
present serious scalability issues when the volume of data increases (Chakaravarthy et al., 2008). In 
order to overcome those problems, researchers have focused on designing automatic sanitization 
methods. Some schemes like (Chakaravarthy et al., 2008) use databases of entities (e.g., persons, 
products, diseases, etc) to detect sensitive elements. Other proposals like (Sweeney, 1996) base the 
sanitization on a set of patterns corresponding to sensitive information such as name, location, etc. 
More general mechanisms like (Abril et al., 2011) and (Cumby & Ghani, 2011) assume that named 
entities (i.e., proper nouns), due to their specificity, should be sanitized; to do that, automatic named 
entity recognition techniques are used.  
However, in order to automatically sanitize documents from a general perspective, in which textual 
sources may cover a wide range of topics, refer to heterogeneous entities and for which no predefined 
structure may be assumed, most of the above approaches are not well-suited. More specifically, 
methods that are based on problem-specific and ad-hoc knowledge bases or trained classifiers are 
hardly generalizable. Methods based on the detection of named entities (NEs) offer a more general 
solution, however, as stated in (Sánchez et al., 2012), it usually happens that not all NEs reveal 
confidential information since they may refer to general entities (e.g. country names) and not all 
sensitive information is expressed with NEs (e.g. names of diseases, rare jobs, etc.). Moreover, NE 
recognition is usually limited to a set of categories (e.g. persons, locations or organizations). To tackle 
these problems, the authors in (Sánchez et al., 2012) propose a method based on Information Theory 
and the use of a large corpus, to assess the degree of sensitiveness of terms according to the amount of 
information that they provide. This approach relies on the fact that sensitive terms are those that, due 
to their specificity, provide more information than common terms. In this way, the textual terms that 
provide too much information (according to a predefined criterion) are detected and sanitized. To 
quantify the amount of information provided by each element, the proposed system uses the notion of 
Information Content (IC), computed from a corpus as large as the Web. A practical comparison 
against a state-of-the-art NE recognition package (i.e., Stanford Named Entity Recognizer (Finkel et 
al., 2005)), shown that the information theoretic approach significantly improved the detection recall 
while offer a more general and less constrained solution (Sánchez et al., 2012). 
In any case, the above mechanisms share a fundamental limitation: they evaluate the sensitivity of 
textual terms considering them as independent variables. For example, a certain scheme that uses a 
database of diseases to detect sensitive elements in a document may identify the term AIDS as 
sensitive but other terms appearing within the same document such as immunodeficiency, blood 
transfusion and sexual transmission may not be detected. Nevertheless, those terms are semantically 
related and, hence, the latter may enable the re-identification of the former by means of semantic 
inference (Anandan & Clifton, 2011).  
The prevention of the disclosure of sensitive information from the combination of, a priori, non-
sensitive elements has been widely covered by the Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) research field 
(Domingo-Ferrer, 2008; Martínez et al., 2012). However, the solutions which are proposed in that area 
deal with structured databases where record attributes whose combination of values may 
unequivocally identify an individual (named as quasi-identifiers) are defined a priori. Clearly, this 
requirement does not hold in a scenario with unstructured textual documents in which any 
combination of terms may potentially cause disclosure if a semantic relationship exists. Hence, new 
approaches that specifically focus on this problem should be provided to improve document 
sanitization methods. 
1.1 Previous work on detecting term relationships when sanitizing unstructured documents 
The existence of relationships between terms in unstructured documents has been barely addressed in 
the sanitization literature. Nevertheless, the relevance of this issue is stressed in (Anandan & Clifton, 
2011). More specifically, the authors of that work show that sanitized terms could be re-identified 
given the presence of non-sanitized (or even generalized) ones in the same context. In that work, re-
identification is enabled by a contingency table that quantifies the degree of correlation between each 
pair of textual terms and a taxonomy modelling term generalization. Unfortunately, the availability of 
such accurate contingency table and associated taxonomy in a general setting is quite unrealistic, 
hampering the applicability of the method that, on the other hand, provides a clear characterization of 
the disclosure risks inherent to presence of term relationships. 
A more practical but hardly generalizable approach is presented in (Chakaravarthy et al., 2008). In that 
work, authors present a scheme that detects sensitive elements using a database of entities (e.g., 
persons, products, diseases, etc).  Each entity in this database is associated to a certain context which 
contains a set of terms related to that entity (e.g., the context of a disease could include symptoms, 
treatments, risk factors, etc). Using this information, the proposed system detects terms to be sanitized 
in a straightforward manner by looking for sensitive entities and their contexts in the input database. 
Due to the cost of manually compiling such database covering a wide range of related terms, that 
proposal is mainly designed to work with domain-specific documents.  
1.2 Contribution and plan of this paper 
Due to the lack of practical and general-purpose schemes considering term relationships during the 
sanitization of documents, in this paper, we propose a method that automatically removes highly 
related terms in order to minimize disclosure risk of the sanitized output. The method is designed as an 
extension of the system proposed in (Sánchez et al., 2012) that, even though it provides more accurate 
and less constrained results than usual sanitization mechanisms found in the literature, it solely 
evaluates term sensitivity in an independent way.  
Our contribution in the present paper consists on quantifying term relationships between terms 
detected as sensitive by (Sánchez et al., 2012) with those that were left in clear form. As a result, those 
terms for which a high enough relationship exists, according to a specific criterion that guides the 
sanitization process, are removed from the output. Our proposal also relies on Information Theory to 
automatically quantify the degree of term relationship and propose new terms to sanitize. Practical 
results reported in the evaluation section show that our proposal significantly reduces the disclosure 
risk of the outputs provided by (Sánchez et al., 2012).   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes the sanitization scenario, describes 
the details of the individual sanitization proposed in (Sánchez et al., 2012) and how our proposal 
behaves as a complement to it. Section 3 evaluates the performance of the new scheme against 
baseline results using a set of real documents. The last section contains the conclusions and proposes 
some lines of future work. 
2 DOCUMENT SANITIZATION AND TERM RELATIONSHIPS 
The document sanitization scenario tackled in this paper is defined as follows: 
• 𝐷. The original document to sanitize. It is viewed as an ordered sequence of textual terms (i.e., 
words or phrases). 
• 𝑆1. The sanitization method presented in (Sánchez et al., 2012), which detects sensitive terms 
independently. 
• 𝐷′. The output of the sanitizer 𝑆1 for an input document 𝐷, that is 𝐷′ = 𝑆1(𝐷). It is assumed that, 
in document 𝐷′, sensitive terms detected by 𝑆1 have been tagged but not removed yet. 
• 𝑖𝑡𝑗. Each one of the sensitive terms contained in 𝐷′, which have been identified by  𝑆1. 
• 𝑛𝑡𝑗. Each one of the terms in 𝐷′ which have not been identified as sensitive by  𝑆1. 
• 𝑆2. This is our new proposal. It takes as input the sanitized document 𝐷′ and identifies which non-
sensitive terms, 𝑛𝑡𝑗, may potentially re-identify any of the sensitive terms, 𝑖𝑡𝑗. 
• 𝑟𝑡𝑗 . Each one of the, a priori, non-sensitive terms in 𝐷′, which have been found to be highly 
related to a sanitized one by the proposed sanitization method 𝑆2. 
• 𝐷′′. This is the output of the proposed sanitizer 𝑆2, that is, 𝐷′′ = 𝑆2(𝐷′), in which both sensitive 
terms detected by 𝑆1,  𝑖𝑡𝑗, and highly related ones detected by  𝑆2, 𝑟𝑡𝑗, have been removed.  
Basically, the new sanitization system 𝑆2 takes as input a document 𝐷′ that contains a set of terms 
identified as sensitive (𝐼 = {𝑖𝑡1, … , 𝑖𝑡𝑘}) and a remaining set of non-sensitive ones (𝑁 = �𝑛𝑡1, … ,𝑛𝑡𝑝�). 
Then, for each 𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑆2  evaluates its degree of relationship against any 𝑛𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 . As a result, 𝑆2 
provides a subset 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑁, where 𝑅 = �𝑟𝑡1, … , 𝑟𝑡𝑞�, that contains all those highly related terms that 
might disclose any element of 𝐼. The sanitization output consists on a document 𝐷′′ from which terms 
in 𝐼 and also those in 𝑅 have been removed. 
The next two subsections describe both sanitizers: Section 2.1 briefly introduces the sanitization 
method 𝑆1  which was presented in (Sánchez et al., 2012) whereas Section 2.2 details the new 
method 𝑆2; finally, Section 2.3 presents an illustrative example showing how 𝑆2  complements the 
sanitization offered by  𝑆1 in order to minimize disclosure risk. 
2.1 Sanitization method 𝐒𝟏: detecting sensitive terms 
The method by (Sánchez et al., 2012) starts by extracting noun phrases (NPs) from the input document, 
since it is assumed that some of those may reveal sensitive data. To do so, 𝑆1  relies on natural 
language processing tools such as OpenNLP1
• Sentence detection. 
, to perform the following steps: 
• Tokenization (i.e., word detection, including contraction separation). 
• Part-of-speech tagging (POS) of individual tokens. 
• Syntactic parsing of POS tagged tokens. As a result, NPs are extracted. 
• Removal of stop words (e.g., determinants, prepositions or adverbs) from NPs. 
After that, the degree of sensitiveness of each NP is quantified according the amount of information it 
provides. As stated in the introduction, sensitive terms are considered as those that provide more 
                                              
1 OpenNLP, Apache Software Foundation, http://opennlp.apache.org [last accessed: January 4th, 2013] 
information than non-sensitive ones because the latter tend to be more general than the former. More 
specifically, 𝑆1 relies on Information Theory and, in particular, on the notion of Information Content 
(IC) of textual terms to quantify the amount of information provided by a NP.  
The IC of a term 𝑡 is computed as the inverse of its probability of appearance in a corpus (𝑝(𝑡)) (see 
Equation 1). In this manner, infrequent terms (e.g. pancreatic cancer) are considered more informative 
than common ones (e.g. disease). 
 𝐼𝐶(𝑡) = −𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝(𝑡)                        (1) 
In order to unambiguously compute term frequencies, classic proposals like (Resnik, 1995) use tagged 
textual data as corpora. Nevertheless, this solution has two main drawbacks: (i) such a corpus must be 
compiled and tagged manually, which represents an important cost; and (ii) it is unlikely to have a 
tagged corpora large and representative enough to cover a wide range of general and specific domains. 
This last situation may lead to data sparseness problems (i.e., the fact that not enough data is available 
to extract reliable conclusions from their analysis) when computing the IC of concrete terms (e.g., rare 
diseases), names or recent terms (e.g., netbook, tablet) (Sánchez, Batet, Valls, et al., 2010). Due to the 
fact that document sanitization focuses precisely on concrete (i.e., highly informative) terms, a wider 
corpus covering all those cases is required in order to obtain valid IC values. 
In contrast to ad-hoc corpora, the Web can be considered a general-purpose corpus that covers almost 
any possible up-to-date term. According to (Cilibrasi & Vitányi, 2006), the Web is so large and 
heterogeneous that it tends to represent the true current distribution of terms at a social scale. As a 
result, the Web can be used to compute realistic IC values (Sánchez, Batet, Valls, et al., 2010). 
Moreover, Web Search Engines (WSEs), such as Google or Bing, can be directly queried to obtain 
term occurrences (i.e., page counts) at a web-scale (Sánchez, Batet, Valls, et al., 2010; Turney, 2001) 
in order to compute term probabilities.   
Hence, using the Web as corpora, 𝑆1 quantifies the IC of a potentially sensitive term 𝑡 as follows: 
𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑡) =  − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑡) = − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2  𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑡)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠  ,                 (2) 
where 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠(𝑡) stands for the number of results provided by a WSE when querying 𝑡; and 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠 represents the total amount of web sites indexed by the WSE (e.g., around 11 billion in 
Bing2
The final step of the sanitization method consists on assessing which NPs provide too much 
information according to their IC and, hence, should be sanitized. To achieve that, a detection 
threshold 𝛽 stating the sanitization criterion is fixed by the user. This value, which is also expressed in 
terms of IC, represents the amount of information provided by the most general term that the user 
wants to hide in the sanitization output. For example, if the objective is to hide that a certain document 
(e.g. an electronic health care record) refers to acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, the detection 
threshold should be fixed as  𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒") . Hence, 𝑆1 
marks as sensitive (in 𝐷′) all NPs that are equally or more informative than 𝛽 (i.e., ∀ 𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏�𝑖𝑡𝑗� ≥ 𝛽). These NPs should be sanitized (i.e. removed) from the sanitized output. 
). 
2.2 Sanitization method 𝐒𝟐: detecting risky term relationships 
The input of  𝑆2 is the document 𝐷′, which has been already sanitized by 𝑆1. This document states the 
set of NPs detected as sensitive 𝑖𝑡𝑗  by 𝑆1 , and maintains the rest of, a priori, non-sensitive ones, 
𝑛𝑡𝑗 .Then, the purpose of 𝑆2  is to identify which 𝑛𝑡𝑗  may disclose any of the already detected 
sensitive 𝑖𝑡𝑗.  
                                              
2 http://www.worldwidewebsize.com/ [last accessed: January, 2013] 
In order to achieve that, we hypothesize that the disclosure risk derived from the presence of a certain 
term  𝑛𝑡𝑗 with regard to an already sanitized term 𝑖𝑡𝑗 when both appear in the same document, can be 
measured according to the amount of information that 𝑛𝑡𝑗, which would appear in clear form in the 
sanitized output, reveals about 𝑖𝑡𝑗. In terms of Information Theory, the amount of Mutual Information 
(MI) between terms, which measures the correlation between variables, can be used to extract such 
information. In particular, the instantiation of MI for two specific observations results in the well-
known Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI), which quantifies the difference between the probability 
of their co-occurrence given their join distribution and their marginal distributions (Church & Hanks, 
1990). Applying PMI to measure the mutual information between a sanitized and a non-sanitized term 
we obtain the following expression:  
𝑃𝑀𝐼�𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑛𝑡𝑗� = 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑝(𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗)𝑝�𝑖𝑡𝑗� × 𝑝(𝑛𝑡𝑗)           (3) 
PMI has been successfully applied in the past to evaluate different types of semantic correlations such 
as word collocation (Bouma, 2009), synonymy (Turney, 2001), taxonomic subsumption and similarity 
(Sánchez, 2010; Sánchez, Batet, & Valls, 2010; Vicient et al., 2013) and a variety of non-taxonomic 
relationships (Sánchez, 2010; Sánchez & Moreno, 2008). From these works, one can conclude that 
PMI is a suitable measure in the context of document sanitization, in which a high semantic 
correlation between term pairs may enable disclosure regardless the type of correlation (i.e., 
taxonomic or non-taxonomic).  
Notice also that, in terms of Information Content, PMI fulfils that  𝑃𝑀𝐼(𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗) = 𝐼𝐶(𝑖𝑡𝑗) −
𝐼𝐶(𝑖𝑡𝑗|𝑛𝑡𝑗), where the conditional information content of 𝑖𝑡𝑗 given the presence of 𝑛𝑡𝑗 is computed 
as 𝐼𝐶(𝑖𝑡𝑗|𝑛𝑡𝑗) =  − log2 𝑝(𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗) 𝑝(𝑛𝑡𝑗)⁄ . From the former expression, it turns out that 𝑃𝑀𝐼(𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗) 
can be used to measure how much information the presence of  𝑛𝑡𝑗  discloses about 𝑖𝑡𝑗  (which is 
assumed to be removed in the sanitization process).  
Numerically, if 𝑖𝑡𝑗  and 𝑛𝑡𝑗  are completely independent (i.e., they co-occur in a textual context by 
chance), the result for Equation 3 is 𝑃𝑀𝐼(𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑛𝑡𝑗) = 0 . This means that the presence of 𝑛𝑡𝑗 does not 
provide any particular evidence of 𝑖𝑡𝑗  and, hence, there is no disclosure risk. On the contrary, if 
whenever 𝑛𝑡𝑗 occurs, 𝑖𝑡𝑗  also occurs (i.e.,  𝑝�𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗� = 𝑝(𝑛𝑡𝑗) ), the result of Equation 3 
is 𝑃𝑀𝐼(𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑛𝑡𝑗) =  − log2 𝑝(𝑖𝑡𝑗) = 𝐼𝐶(𝑖𝑡𝑗). This means that, when 𝑃𝑀𝐼�𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑛𝑡𝑗� =  𝐼𝐶(𝑖𝑡𝑗), it can be 
concluded that the presence of  𝑛𝑡𝑗  in a document completely discloses  𝑖𝑡𝑗  and, hence, there is 
maximum disclosure risk. 
Hence, negative or zero values for PMI will result in no disclosure risk, whereas positive values will 
indicate an increasing risk. 
Considering the above theoretical background, 𝑆2 quantifies the disclosure risk caused by the potential 
semantic relationship between any sanitized and non-sanitized term in 𝐷′. Like in 𝑆1, to provide a 
general-purpose solution, we query WSEs to compute web-scale term probabilities (see section 2.1), 
obtaining the following expression: 
  𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑖𝑡𝑗,𝑛𝑡𝑗) = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑖𝑡𝑗) − 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑖𝑡𝑗|𝑛𝑡𝑗) = = − 𝑙𝑜𝑔2  𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠("𝑖𝑡𝑗")𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠("𝑖𝑡𝑗" 𝐴𝑁𝐷 "𝑛𝑡𝑗") 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠⁄𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠("𝑛𝑡𝑗") 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑊𝑒𝑏𝑠⁄                (4) 
Notice the use of double quotes (“”) in web queries to force the search for the exact term and the use 
of the AND operator to force the co-occurrence of both terms within the same document. 
After that, 𝑆2 should assess which term relationships may incur in disclosure risk according to their 
PMI values. Whenever this happens, the preliminary non-sensitive term 𝑛𝑡𝑗  is proposed for 
sanitization (i.e., 𝑛𝑡𝑗 →  𝑟𝑡𝑗).  
To do so, 𝑆2 considers as risky those relationships whose PMI (computed using Equation 4) is higher 
or equal than a threshold 𝜏. To define 𝜏 in a way that is coherent with the criterion implemented by 𝑆1, 
we compute 𝜏 as a function of  𝑆1’s sanitization threshold 𝛽. Recall that 𝛽 corresponded to the IC of 
the most general term considered as sensitive by 𝑆1. We weight this value by a user-defined parameter 
𝑤 that represents the relative amount (in parts per unit) of information that the non-sanitized term 𝑛𝑡𝑗is 
allowed to reveal about the sensitive term 𝑖𝑡𝑗, as follows: 
 𝜏 =  𝑤 · 𝛽   ,                   (5) 
where 𝑤 is defined in the interval [0..1].   
Since 𝑤 weights 𝛽, and the latter measures IC, the resulting 𝜏 is also expressed in terms of IC and 
reflects the maximum amount of information that a non-sanitized term may disclose about a sensitive 
one. In this way, for any pair of terms that obtains a PMI value equal or above 𝜏, we consider that the 
non-sanitized term reveals too much information of the sensitive one and, hence, it must be sanitized 
(i.e., 𝑛𝑡𝑗 →  𝑟𝑡𝑗). Values of 𝑤 close to 1, state that we allow revealing almost all the information 
provided by a sensitive term. Inversely, values of 𝑤 close to 0, state that we allow revealing a very low 
percentage of sensitive information. 
Formally, the set 𝑅 = �𝑟𝑡1, … , 𝑟𝑡𝑞� of too highly related terms that may enable disclosure of elements 
in 𝐼 from a document 𝐷′is obtained as follows: 
𝑅 = �𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 | ∃𝑖𝑡𝑗 ∈ 𝐼 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑤𝑒𝑏(𝑖𝑡𝑗 ,𝑛𝑡𝑗) ≥ 𝜏�                                (6) 
As a result of this process, the final output of the system will be a document 𝐷′′in which all terms in 
𝐼(detected by  𝑆1) and in 𝑅(detected by  𝑆2) will be removed.  
It is worth to mention that a sanitized document generally losses part of its usability as a result of term 
removal. Hence, the more strict the sanitization is (i.e., 𝑤 value close to 0), the more the eliminated 
terms are and, hence, the more the document usability decreases. Nevertheless, eliminating terms also 
reduces disclosure risk. According to that, there is a clear trade-off between the level of privacy and 
the level of usability achieved by the sanitized document. Therefore, by setting 𝑤 and, hence, 𝜏, users 
can configure their desired level of trade-off. 
2.3 Example 
Consider that the text shown in Figure 1 is the document 𝐷 that will be sanitized by the application of  𝑆1 + 𝑆2. 
 
Figure 1. Sample document to be sanitized. 
Let us assume that the threshold for the first sanitization mechanism,  𝑆1 , was fixed to  𝛽 =
𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑒"). This means that the goal is to get a sanitized 
output that does not disclose this disease. First,  𝑆1 detects the NPs of the input text. Later, their IC is 
computed and all those that provide an amount of information equal or above 𝛽  are marked as 






The patient suffers from acquired immunodeficiency syndrome because of blood transfusion. He 




acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 14.33 
blood transfusion 12.70 
He 2.87 
immune system 10.54 
influenza 9.52 
Table 1. IC values computed from Bing for each NP (once stop words are removed). 
Note that, in this case,  𝛽 = 14.33 and, hence, only the NP “acquired immunodeficiency syndrome” 
has been sanitized. The output of this process 𝐷′, is shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Document 𝐷′ outputted by  𝑆1.  
Next, the proposed method  𝑆2 gets 𝐷′ as input and evaluates all the possible relationships between the 
sensitive term “acquired immunodeficiency syndrome” and the rest of the NPs of the document. All 
relationships with PMIs above the threshold 𝜏 will be proposed for further sanitization. Let us assume 
that the parameter 𝑤 is set to 𝑤 = 0.6, which states that we allow revealing up to a 60% of sensitive 
information. Considering that  𝛽 = 14.33 , we obtain a threshold 𝜏 = 8.59. According to this value,  𝑆2 sanitizes all non-sensitive terms 𝑛𝑡𝑗  whose PMI is above  𝜏. Table 2 depicts the different PMI 
values. As a result, the terms “blood transfusion” and “Immune system”, which are closely related to 
“acquired immunodeficiency syndrome”, are proposed for sanitization. Figure 3 shows the final 
sanitized output 𝐷′′. 
 
Sensitive term Non-sensitive terms PMI 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome patient 6.60 
blood transfusion 9.19 
He 2.22 
Immune system 8.89 
influenza 7.43 
Table 2. PMI values for each relationship between the sensitive term “acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome” and other NPs in 𝐷′.  
 
Figure 3. Final sanitized document 𝐷′′outputted by  𝑆2.  
3 EVALUATION 
This section presents some results that show the degree of accuracy achieved by the proposed 
mechanism in detecting sensitive elements of raw textual documents. Since our method works as a 
second sanitization step for the method presented in (Sánchez et al., 2012), we evaluate the level of 
improvement provided by the new proposal by comparing the results obtained by the combination of 
𝑆1 + 𝑆2 with the results provided by 𝑆1 alone. 
In order to test our method in a realistic setting and to enable a fair comparison with the results 
provided by 𝑆1, we employ the same set of real texts used in (Sánchez et al., 2012). In particular, they 
The [NP patient] suffers from [NP acquired immunodeficiency syndrome] because of a [NP blood 
transfusion]. [NP He] was diagnosed when his [NP immune system] responded poorly to [NP 
influenza]. 
 
[NP The patient] suffers from [NP acquired immunodeficiency syndrome] because of [NP blood 
transfusion]. [NP He] was diagnosed when [NP his immune system] responded poorly to [NP 
influenza]. 
 
correspond to six biographical sketches about actors/actresses taken from English Wikipedia articles. 
Wikipedia descriptions of concrete entities usually contain a high amount of identifiable and 
correlated information, which makes the detection of sensitive data a challenging task. 
To evaluate the results obtained by both methods, we requested two human experts to select and agree 
on which terms or term combinations (i.e. relationships) may enable disclosure of the described entity, 
considering that it is desired to hide the fact that each evaluated text refers to a certain actor/actress. In 
other words, under this sanitization requirement, an external observer who reads the sanitized version 
of the sketch linked to, for example, Sylvester Stallone would be able to learn that this document refers 
to a person or to an actor, but she would not be able to learn that it refers to Sylvester Stallone (the 
term “actor” is more general/provides less information than the term “Sylvester Stallone”). According 
to that, the threshold 𝛽 used in 𝑆1 to sanitize the text that refers to a particular actor is set to the actor’s 
name, this is 𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒"). 
To compute term and relationship sensitiveness, the Bing Web Search Engine, which indexes 
approximately 11 billion of web sites, has been used. The detection performance is quantified by 
means of precision, recall and F-measure (Manning et al., 2008). 
Precision is calculated as the percentage between the number of terms detected by the automatic 
sanitization method (let us name this set 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠) that have also been selected by 
the human experts (named 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠), and the total number of terms that have been 
detected by the automatic sanitization method. This is represented in Equation 7. Note that the higher 
the precision, the more accurate the sanitization output will be. 
                         Precision = |𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 ∩ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠||𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠| ∗ 100                             (7) 
Recall is calculated as the percentage between the number of sensitive terms that are both in 
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 and 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 sets and the total number of terms that 
have been detected by the human experts. This is represented in Equation 8. The higher the recall, the 
lower the disclosure risk because a lower number of non-detected sensitive terms (𝑆1) or a lower 
number of terms that may enable disclosure of a sensitive one (𝑆2) would remain in the sanitized text. 
                              Recall = |𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠 ∩ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠||𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠| ∗ 100                              (8) 
Finally, F-measure quantifies the harmonic mean of recall and precision, summarizing the detection 
accuracy of the automatic sanitization method.  This is represented in Equation 9. 
                                                      F-measure = 2 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛                                                       (9) 
 
 
Figure 4. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Antonio Banderas” with 
𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑜 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑠") and different values of 𝑤. 
 
 
Figure 5. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Javier Bardem” with 
𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐽𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑚") and different values of 𝑤. 
 
 
Figure 6. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Arnold Schwarzenegger with 𝛽 =
𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐴𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟") and different values of 𝑤. 
 
 
Figure 7. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Jordi Mollà” with 𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐽𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖 𝑀𝑜𝑙𝑙à") 
and different values of 𝑤. 
 
 
Figure 8. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Sylvester Stallone” with 
𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝑆𝑦𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒") and different values of 𝑤. 
 
 
Figure 9. Precision, Recall and F-measure obtained by Method  𝑆1 alone and for the 
combination of 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 for the entity “Audrey Hepburn” with  𝛽 = 𝐼𝐶𝑤𝑒𝑏("𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑦 𝐻𝑒𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑛") and different values of 𝑤. 
 
Results related to precision (the first graph in Figures 4-9) show that, generally, the method  𝑆1 
working alone achieves a better accuracy than  𝑆1 + 𝑆2. This was expected because precision mainly 
depends on the number of false positives (i.e., those terms considered as sensitive that were not 
according to the human criterion) and, hence, since the combination of  𝑆1 + 𝑆2 tends to sanitize more 
terms than 𝑆1, the former will more likely achieve a lower precision. The level of precision obtained 
by 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 depends directly on the fixed parameter 𝑤. For values of  𝑤 close to 1, the threshold 𝜏 is 
larger and more similar to the 𝛽 criterion used by  𝑆1. Hence, the number of detected terms by  𝑆2with 
respect to those detected by  𝑆1 is smaller, resulting in better precision. On the other hand, for values 
of  𝑤 close to 0, the threshold 𝜏 is smaller and the sanitization implemented by  𝑆2  becomes more 
exhaustive since most of terms co-occurring in a document are related in some degree; thus the 
number of false positives (which may hamper document’s utility) tends to increase. 
Recall, on the other hand, represents a more important dimension than precision in the context of 
document sanitization, due to the fact that a method that achieves a low recall is more likely to 
generate sanitized documents that contain sensitive terms or that enable disclosure of sanitized terms. 
It is worth to mention that a single remaining sensitive term in a sanitized text might be able to fully 
disclose the information that the sanitization method tries to protect. The results related to Recall (the 
second graph in Figures 4-9) show that the use of the new proposal always achieves a better recall than 
method  𝑆1 working alone. Moreover, recall results for  𝑆1 + 𝑆2 are better when the value 𝑤 is closer 
to 0 (that is, a very low amount of information regarding the sensitive term is disclosed). This is 
coherent because in those cases the sanitization mechanism becomes more restrictive and more terms 
are detected as sensitive (Recall improves while Precision decays). From the point of view of the 
information disclosure risk, these results show that the new step 𝑆2, is a necessary addition to the 
sanitization process of a document. 
Finally, the F-measure reflects the global accuracy of the tested methods. The results related to this 
performance aspect (the third graph in Figures 4-9) show that, in almost all the cases, the new proposal 
outperforms method  𝑆1  working alone, showing a better trade-off between precision (which 
influences document’s utility) and recall (which directly affects disclosure risk). Only in the texts 
related to Sylvester Stallone (Figure 8) and Audrey Hepburn (Figure 9), and for values of the 𝑤 
parameter closer to 0, the method  𝑆1 obtains a better f-measure. In average, we observe that a 𝑤 
around 0.4 or 0.6 provides the best trade-off between precision and recall, even though this can be 
configured by the user to fit her sanitization needs (i.e. more utility or reduced disclosure risk). 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Several sanitization mechanisms can be found in the literature; however, almost all of them evaluate 
the sensitivity of the textual terms considering them as independent variables. This situation is not 
ideal because works like (Anandan & Clifton, 2011) have shown that disclosure risk is inherently 
dependant on the existence of semantic relationships between terms. More specifically, it has been 
proved that sanitized terms could be re-identified given the presence of non-sanitized ones in the same 
context.  
In this paper, an automatic text sanitization method focusing on discovering and quantifying term 
relationships has been proposed. This new scheme works as an extension to the system presented in 
(Sánchez et al., 2012). It gets as input a set of terms that have been detected as sensitive and verifies if 
they are semantically correlated with any other term of the document which has been left, a priori, in 
clear form. Our proposal relies on the foundations of the information theory and a corpus as global as 
the Web to offer a general-purpose solution that can be automatically applied to heterogeneous textual 
documents. 
Evaluation results have shown that the proposed method is able to significantly increase the detection 
recall of the system presented in (Sánchez et al., 2012), which, in turn, was better than usual 
sanitization methods based on NE recognition (Abril et al., 2011). As a result, the disclosure risk of 
the sanitized output was minimized, while providing reasonable levels of accuracy (i.e. utility).  
Regarding the future work, we plan to apply and evaluate the performance of the proposed method to 
other types of sanitizers (e.g. based on NE-detection (Abril et al., 2011; Cumby & Ghani, 2011), 
databases (Chakaravarthy et al., 2008), etc.) and other kind of general and domain-dependant 
documents. Moreover, since our approach is only meant to discover binary relationships, but 
disclosure may appear with combinations of several non-sanitized terms, we also plan to extend our 
method to support relationships of larger cardinalities.   
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